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20 August 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination
SUBJECT : Storage of Vital Intelligence Documents

1. At the instigation of committee desire expressed at the meeting on 16 August 1948, the ICAPS member of the committee has contacted the State Department, Army, Navy and Air Force, along the lines of my memorandum to the Director of Intelligence, subject as above, dated 17 August. In addition to this, I have contacted several other persons in the Department of the Army concerning this matter.

2. Present indications in response to the questions of paragraph 4 of the above mentioned letter are:

a. Department of State has done nothing toward providing storage for vital documents. They are not certain as to what action, if any, will be taken. They, further, are interested in CIA providing the storage space and the reproduction.

b. The Army is interested in having CIA furnish the storage space and the facilities mentioned. They, further, feel that in order to obviate as much unnecessary duplication as is possible, that every effort should be made to coordinate such reproduction as is done by CIA with the other intelligence agencies in order that they, in turn, may not feel the necessity to reproduce and store the same documents. Certain decentralization planning is going forward on a joint basis in response to a directive from the Secretary of Defense. See paragraphs 3 and 4.

c. The Navy Department is unable to produce a certain response concerning intelligence documents at this time, since the problem is linked with that of the storage of vital operational records. It is possible that a response may be received prior to the meeting on 23 August.

d. The Air Force has no active program concerning the storage problem, but has made dissemination of the Bombing Encyclopedia and target folders to the Strategic Air Command at Andrews Field. Present consideration in the Air Force is that such dissemination may not

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be considered adequate, in as much as Andrews Field is close to Washington. They desire to participate in such a program, when such is developed.

3. A joint committee, under directive from the Secretary of Defense is working on the problem of the decentralization of the Armed Forces away from the Metropolitan district of Washington. Colonel Henry M. Zeller (Policy Branch, P. and O. Division, phone National Defense 2124), is the Army member and Steering Member of this joint committee. I am unaware of other membership. A directive is in the course of preparation, visualizing a small establishment at the Seat of Government, (presumed Washington, D. C.), another comparatively small Joint Command Post in another location, located somewhere on the existing coaxial telecommunicational lines; a Joint Logistics Center, at which industrial mobilization planning and activities as well as supply functions will be located at a third location, and, three, probably separately located headquarters for the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Present thinking includes, but has not been explored, a centralized location possibly away from any of the above mentioned four locations, for the intelligence activities of the Armed Forces. Present thinking, is also to the effect that the Department of State, as such, will probably be located at the Seat of Government. Consideration of the location of the intelligence activities of the Department of State and the CIA at the centralized intelligence point noted above may be opened.

4. In the event that the intelligence activities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are located at its decentralized headquarters, or at a central point other than these headquarters the major portion of the reproduction problem facing the Armed Forces will be eliminated. The problem of how much of service originated intelligence material within CIA which should be reproduced will be a matter of assessing the risk of destruction of the various decentralized service headquarters.

5. Since the actions of the Armed Forces are dependent upon the present decentralization planning and since the proposals made to the Armed Forces visualized each choosing and reproducing the material it desired to safeguard, I recommend that CIA proceed with its planning in this matter on the basis that the Armed Forces and the Department of State will participate in this storage at least to a limited extent. I further recommend that the Armed Forces and the State Department be kept abreast of CIA planning and actions, and that the whole position concerning IAC participation be re-opened prior to the reaching of a decision for a place of storage, in order that any change of attitude or desire to be included in the storage program may be used in assessing the place and size of the repository.

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Colonel, GSC